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I.

INTRODUCTION
As the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) begins its work investigating wartime

atrocities and prosecuting those who are criminally responsible, it will encounter countless
acts of sexual violence.

This report is a resource to assist in the effective analysis,

prosecution, and adjudication of crimes involving sexual violence.
The ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Court for Rwanda (“ICTR”), have convicted
individuals of crimes against humanity and war crimes for various acts of sexual violence
including rape, sexual mutilation, and sexual slavery. Perpetrators of acts like these have
been convicted of enslavement, torture, rape, persecution, and other inhumane acts as crimes
against humanity; torture, cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity, including
rape, as violations of the laws and customs of war; and the grave breaches of inhuman
treatment and wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health. In addition
to holding individuals criminally liable for sexual crimes, evidence regarding sexual violence
has been relevant in establishing an important element for genocide charges—serious bodily
or mental harm. Evidence of sexual violence has also been used to demonstrate a consistent
pattern of conduct.1
This report provides lawyers, judges, academics, and activists with an overview of the
jurisprudence that has developed at the ad hoc tribunals regarding sexual crimes. Each
section begins with the elements of the relevant crimes as outlined in the ICC Elements of
Crimes and then discusses the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence.
II.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION: THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND THE ICC
The ad hoc tribunals and the ICC have similar subject matter jurisdictional mandates.

All three institutions have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of
the laws and customs of war, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The Rome
Statute2 however specifies a greater number of sexual violence crimes than either the ICTY
Statute or the ICTR Statute.

1
2

See ICTY Rule 93, ICTR Rule 93.
The Rome Statute is the document establishing the ICC and granting the ICC its jurisdictional mandate.
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A. Crimes Against Humanity
All three institutions have jurisdiction over enslavement, torture, rape, persecution,
and other inhumane acts. The Rome Statute, however, enumerates sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence
of comparable gravity as within its jurisdiction as crimes against humanity. The ad hoc
tribunals have not ignored these specific forms of sexual violence, but they were not
specifically enumerated within their jurisdictional mandates. The ICTY and the ICTR have
held that they have jurisdiction over these forms of sexual violence as crimes against
humanity based on their jurisdiction over “other inhumane acts.” The ad hoc tribunals’
statutes grant jurisdiction over persecution on political, racial and religious grounds. The
Rome Statute’s grant of jurisdiction over persecution is broader. It includes persecution
against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds
that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court.3
B. War Crimes
The ICTY, ICTR, and ICC have jurisdiction over torture or inhuman treatment,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and outrages upon
personal dignity. The category of outrages upon personal dignity at the ICTR specifically
mentions humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of
indecent assault.4 The Rome Statute creates separate sub-categories for rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, any other form of sexual
violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions (for international armed
conflicts), or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of article
3 common to the four Geneva Conventions (for non-international armed conflicts).5
Part III provides a detailed overview of the elements of the crimes relevant for acts of
sexual violence within the ICC’s jurisdiction and the supporting jurisprudence from the ad
hoc tribunals.

3
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Annex II at art. 7(1)(h),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
4
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 & Annex at art. 4(e) (1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
5
Rome Statute at art. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi).
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III.

AD HOC TRIBUNAL SEXUAL VIOLENCE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Genocide
Article 6 of the Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction over genocide. Genocide is

defined as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Acts of sexual violence, like rape, constitute the actus reus for genocide because they cause
“serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.” If such acts are committed with
the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” then
they qualify as genocide. This connection between sexual violence, specifically rape, and
genocide was first made in 1998 by the ICTR in the Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment.6
The ICC Elements of Crimes lists the elements for each of the five categories of
genocidal acts that can constitute genocide. As acts of sexual violence typically fall within
Articles 6(b) (causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group) and 6(d)
(imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group), this section will address
those genocidal acts.
Article 6(b) of the ICC Elements of Crimes states that the elements for genocide by
causing serious bodily or mental harm are that:
1.

The perpetrator caused serious bodily or mental harm to one or more
persons.*

2.

Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical,
racial or religious group.

3.

The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.

4.

The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar

6

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment at para. 731 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu
Trial Judgment].
*
This conduct may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman
or degrading treatment.
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conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself
effect such destruction.
Pursuant to Article 6(d) of the ICC Elements of Crimes, genocide by imposing measures
intended to prevent births requires showing that:
1.

The perpetrator imposed certain measures upon one or more persons.

2.

Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical,
racial or religious group.

3.

The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.

4.

The measures imposed were intended to prevent births within that
group.

5.

The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar
conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself
effect such destruction.

Article 4 of the ICTY Statute and Article 2 of the ICTR Statute grant the respective
tribunals jurisdiction over genocide. In Akayesu the Trial Chamber stated that rape and
sexual violence are some “of the worst ways [to] inflict harm on the victim as he or she
suffers both bodily and mental harm.”7 In Rwanda sexual violence was an integral part of the
process of destroying the Tutsi population. Tutsi women were specifically targeted and raped
and other acts of sexual violence contributed to their destruction and the destruction of the
Tutsi group.8
The idea that rape and other acts of sexual violence satisfy the serious bodily and
mental harm element of genocide has been confirmed by the Trial Chambers in Kayishema,
Musema, Krstić, Kamuhanda, Stakic, Kajelijeli, and Gacumbitsi.9
7

Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 6, at para. 731.
Id. at para. 731, 732 (“Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence because they were Tutsi. Sexual
violence was a step in the process of destruction of the tutsi [sic] group - destruction of the spirit, of the will to
live, and of life itself.”).
9
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment & Sentence at para. 108 (May 21,
1999) [hereinafter Kayishema Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13, Judgment &
Sentence at para. 156 (Jan. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Musema Trial Judgment] (“the Chamber understands the
words ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ to include, but not limited to, acts of bodily or mental torture, inhumane
or degrading treatment, rape, sexual violence, and persecution. The Chamber is of the opinion that ‘serious
harm’ need not entail permanent or irremediable harm.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment at
paras. 509, 513 (Aug. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Krstić Trial Judgment] (In subscribing to the above case-law, the
Chamber holds that inhuman treatment, torture, rape, sexual abuse and deportation are among the acts which
may cause serious bodily or mental injury.”); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment &
Sentence at para. 634 (Sept. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Kamuhanda Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No.
8
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Measures intended to prevent births within the group has been held to include both
physical and mental measures.10

Physical measures include sexual mutilation, enforced

sterilization, forced birth control, forced separation of males and females, and the prohibition
of marriages.11
In Kayishema, the Trial Chamber concluded that there is a connection between rape
and another actus reus for genocide—deliberately inflicting on the targeted group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. The Trial
Chamber held that this concept includes “circumstances which will lead to a slow death, for
example, lack of proper housing, clothing, hygiene and medical care or excessive work or
physical exertion.”12 Concluding that deliberately inflicting, on a group, conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part includes acts that do not
immediately lead to the death of members of the group, the Trial Chamber held that such
conditions include rape.13 Despite these pronouncements the accused in Kayishema were
convicted of genocide based on killing and causing serious bodily and mental harm.14 The
serious bodily and mental harm element was supported with evidence of mutilations and
rapes.15
Rape and other acts of sexual violence have also been used to establish an accused’s
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. In
Niyitegeka the Trial Chamber held that “ordering Interahamwe to undress a Tutsi woman, and
to insert a sharpened piece of wood into her genitalia, after ascertaining that she was of the
Tutsi ethnic group” and leaving the body “with the piece of wood protruding from it, in plain
view on a public road for some three days thereafter” helped establish the Accused’s intent to
destroy the Tutsi ethnic group.16 In Muhimana the Trial Chamber found that Muhimana

IT-97-24, Judgment at 516 (July 31, 2003) [hereinafter Stakic Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case
No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment & Sentence at para. 815 (Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Kajelijeli Trial Judgment]
(noting the Trial Chambers of the ICTR have held that serious bodily harm includes the nonmortal acts of sexual
violence, rape, and mutilation); Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment at para. 291
(June 17, 2004) [hereinafter Gacumbitsi Trial Judgment] (“Serious bodily harm means any form of physical
harm or act that causes serious bodily injury to the victim, such as torture and sexual violence. Serious bodily
harm does not necessarily mean that the harm is irremediable.”).
10
Musema Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 158.
11
Id.
12
Kayishema Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 115.
13
Id. at para. 116.
14
Id. at para. 547.
15
Id.
16
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment & Sentence at para. 416 (May 16, 2003)
[hereinafter Niyitegeka Trial Judgment].
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targeted Tutsi civilians during attacks by shooting and raping them.17 He was found to have
apologized to a young girl he raped after he realized that she was Hutu and not Tutsi and to
have specifically referred to the Tutsi identity of his victims.18 Based on this evidence the
Trial Chamber concluded that Muhimana intended to destroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi
group.19
B. Crimes Against Humanity
The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity pursuant to article 7 of the
Rome Statute. The ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction over crimes against humanity is based on
articles 5 and 3 of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively. The ad hoc tribunals’ statutes
enumerate nine crimes that constitute crimes against humanity when they are committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population.20 The ICTY Statute
states that the nine enumerated crimes are crimes against humanity when they are committed
in an armed conflict, international or non-international, and are directed against any civilian
population.21 The ICTR’s jurisdiction over crimes against humanity is narrower than that of
the ICTY’s. The ICTY Statute follows the customary international law approach, while the
ICTR requires the acts to have taken place as part of a discriminatory attack—an attack on
national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds.22
The Tadic Trial Chamber concluded that crimes against humanity include a
discriminatory intent mens rea requirement, which was reversed on appeal. The Tadic
Appeals Chamber held that the
Prosecution was correct in submitting that the Trial Chamber erred in finding
that all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory intent. Such an intent
is an indispensable legal ingredient of the offence only with regard to those
crimes for which this is expressly required, that is, for Article 5 (h),
concerning various types of persecution.23
The ICC follows the customary international law definition like the ICTY after the Tadic
Appeals Judgment. A crime against humanity for purposes of ICC jurisdiction exists when
17

Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-I, Judgment & Sentence at para. 517 (Apr. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Muhimana Trial Judgment].
18
Id.
19
Id. at para. 518.
20
ICTR Statute at art. 3; S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc S/RES/827 at art.
5 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
21
ICTY Statute at art. 5.
22
ICTR Statute at art. 3.
23
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-95-1-A, Judgment at para. 305 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadic Appeals
Judgment].
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an act in one of eleven enumerated categories is “committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”24
Thus the common elements for all of the crimes against humanity discussed below are
that:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

There must be an attack.
The acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack.
The attack must be “directed against any civilian population.”
The attack must be widespread and systematic, and
The perpetrator must know of the wider context in which he or she is
acting and that his or her acts are part of the attack.
1. Enslavement

Enslavement is a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(C) of the Rome Statute.
The ICC Elements of Crimes defines the elements of enslavement as follows:
1.

The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right
of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling,
lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them
a similar deprivation of liberty.*

2.

The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against a civilian population.

3.

The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
a civilian population.

At the ad hoc tribunals enslavement is a crime against humanity under Article 5(c) of
the ICTY Statute and Article 3(c) of the ICTR Statute. There has been one significant case to
address enslavement and that is the Foca case before the ICTY.25 The ICTY Appeals
Chamber stated that enslavement is a crime against humanity in customary international law.
An enslaved person is one “over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership are exercised.”26 The actus rea for enslavement is the exercise of any or all of the
24

Rome Statute at art. 7.
It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced labour or
otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the
conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.
25
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, Judgment (Feb. 22, 2001) [hereinafter
Foca Trial Judgment].
26
The Appeals Chamber preferred this language, which was used in the 1926 Slavery Convention, to that used
by the Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber stated that enslavement consists of “the exercise of any or all of the
*
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powers attaching to the right of ownership.

Whether specific conditions constitute

enslavement depends on the operation of various indicia of slavery.27 The indicia of slavery
identified by the Appeals Chamber include:
control over someone’s movement, control of physical environment,
psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat
of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel
treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labor.28
The mere ability to buy, sell, trade, or inherit a person or his or her labor is insufficient to
establish enslavement, but the actual occurrence of such actions would be relevant.29
On December 4, 2001, the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial
of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery (“Tokyo Tribunal”) issued its judgment, which found
Emperor Hirohito and other high-ranking officials guilty of rape and sexual slavery as crimes
against humanity based on individual and command responsibility.30 While this judgment
was issued by a people’s tribunal and is not legally binding, its analysis of sexual slavery is
thorough and progressive. Such analysis can serve as a guide for future sexual slavery cases.
As noted above the ICC Elements of Crimes defines sexual slavery as existing when a
perpetrator exercises “any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or
more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons,
or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty” and causes such a person “to engage
in one or more acts of a sexual nature.”31 The Tokyo Tribunal similarly held that the actus
reus of sexual slavery is “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership over a person.”32 The Tokyo Tribunal, however, went further in explicitly stating
that “exercising sexual control over a person or depriving a person of sexual autonomy”
constitutes a power attaching to the right of ownership.33

powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person.” Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, Vukovic, Case No.
IT-96-23&23/1, Judgment at para. 118 (June 12, 2002) [hereinafter Foca Appeals Judgment] (quoting Trial
Judgment at para. 539). The Appeals Chamber stated that because “the law does not know of a ‘right of
ownership over a person,’” the more guarded language of 1926 Slavery Convention is preferable. Id.
27
Id. at para. 119.
28
Id. (quoting Trial Chamber at para. 543).
29
Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 543.
30
Judgment on the Common Indictment and the Application for Restitution and Reparation, at paras. 874-75 (4
Dec. 2001) (Women’s Int’l War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery) [hereinafter
Tokyo Judgment].
31
ICC Elements of Crimes, arts. 7(1)(g)-2, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2, 8(2)(e)(vi)-2.
32
Tokyo Judgment, supra note 30, at para. 620.
33
Id. at para. 620.
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The mens rea requirement for enslavement as stated in Foca is intentionally
exercising, over another person, a power attaching to the right of ownership.34
a. Non-Elements that Could Be Relevant Factors
(1) Consent
The Foca Appeals Chamber specifically stated that lack of consent is not an element
of the crime of enslavement,35 but consent may be relevant for determining whether the
accused exercised powers attaching to the right of ownership with respect to a specific victim
or whether the victim voluntarily consented to take part in the relevant activities.36
(2) Duration
Duration is not an element of the crime of enslavement. The Foca Appeals Chamber
stated that the key issue is the “quality of the relationship between the accused and the
victim.”37 Duration is one of many factors that should be examined to determine the quality
of the relationship.38
2. Torture
Torture is a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(f) of the Rome Statute and
Article 5(f) of the ICTY Statue and Article 3(f) of the ICTR Statue. The ICC Elements of
Crimes defines the elements of torture as follows:
1.

The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering
upon one or more persons.

2.

Such person or persons were in the custody or under the control of the
perpetrator.

3.

Such pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in
or incidental to, lawful sanctions.

4.

The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic

34

Foca Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, at para. 122.
Id. at para. 120 (“Indeed, the Appeals Chamber does not accept the premise that lack of consent is an element
of the crime since, in its view, enslavement flows from claimed rights of ownership; accordingly, lack of consent
does not have to be proved by the Prosecutor as an element of the crime.”) (emphasis added).
36
The Appeals Chamber stated that “from an evidential point of view as going to the question whether the
Prosecutor has established the element of the crime relating to the exercise by the accused of any or all of the
powers attaching to the right of ownership. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber considers that circumstances
which render it impossible to express consent may be sufficient to presume the absence of consent.” Id..
37
Id. at para. 121.
38
Id.
35
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attack directed against a civilian population.
5.

The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
a civilian population.39

Rape and other acts of sexual violence have been charged as torture at the ad hoc
tribunals. Rape constitutes torture when the elements of torture are met.40 The ad hoc
tribunals require the severe pain or suffering necessary for torture to be inflicted for a specific
purpose—to obtain “information or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the
victim or a third person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third
person.” This element does not exist at the ICC and there is a specific note in the ICC
Elements of Crimes for torture as a crime against humanity stating that “It is understood that
no specific purpose need be proved for this crime.”41
The elements for torture as a crime against humanity before the ad hoc tribunals are:
(i)

The infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental.

(ii)

The act or omission must be intentional.

(iii)

The act or omission must aim at obtaining information or a confession,
or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or
at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.42

Prior to 2001, the ad hoc tribunals had a fourth element for torture. This element stated that
“[t]he perpetrator was himself an official, or acted at the instigation of, or with the consent or
acquiescence of, an official or person acting in an official capacity.”43
In 2001, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Foca held that pursuant to customary
international law, torture does not have to be committed by an official, at the instigation of an

39

The heading for torture as a crime against humanity notes that “It is understood that no specific purpose need
be proved for this crime.” International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes, Assembly of States Parties to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1st Sess., Sept. 3-10, 2002, Part II(B) at art. 7(1)(f), ICCASP/1/3 (2002) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes].
40
Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1, Judgment at para. 145 (Nov. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Kvočka Trial
Judgment].
41
ICC Elements of Crimes at Art. 7(1)(f).
42
Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 497; see also Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para.
141; Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20, Judgment & Sentence at para. 343 (May 15, 2003)
[hereinafter Semanza Trial Judgment].
43
Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 6, at para. 594; see also Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al., Case No. IT-96-21,
Judgment at para. 494 (Nov. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Čelebići Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case
No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment at para. 162 (Dec. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Furundzija Trial Judgment].
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official or with the consent of an official or a person acting in an official capacity.44 This
element comes from the Torture Convention, which is an instrument that reflects customary
international law with regard to State obligations. It does not, as the Appeals Chamber stated
in Foca reflect the definition of torture for individual responsibility outside of the framework
of the Torture Convention.45 Subsequent cases have followed Foca and held that torture does
not have an official actor requirement.46
a. Rape as Torture
As noted above rape can constitute torture as a crime against humanity when the
elements of torture are satisfied. In Foca, the Trial Chamber convicted two of the accused of
torture based on their involvement in the rapes of several women. The Trial Chamber found
that Kunarac acted for prohibited purposes when he raped his victims.
discriminate, selecting his victims because of their ethnicity,

47

He acted to

to obtain a confession from

one victim about allegedly sending messages to the Muslim forces, to obtain information
regarding the location of valuables, and to intimidate.48

The Trial Chamber convicted

Kunarac of torture after finding that the rapes resulted in severe mental and physical pain and
suffering for the victims. Kunarac’s co-accused, Vukovic was also convicted of torture based
on acts of rape. The Trial Chamber concluded that he acted to discriminate against the victim
because of her ethnicity. Vukovic argued that even if it was proven that he raped witness
FSW-50, it was done out of sexual urge, not hatred, such that the prohibited purpose mens
rea requirement for torture was not met. The Trial Chamber rejected this argument.49
b. Torture and Official Capacity
The Foca, Kvočka, and Semanza convictions for torture based on acts of rape utilized
the later definition of torture, which does not require the accused to be an official or acting at

44

Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 496.
Foca Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, at para. 148 (“the public official requirement is not a requirement
under customary international law in relation to the criminal responsibility of an individual for torture outside of
the framework of the Torture Convention”).
46
See, e.g., Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para. 141; Semanza Trial Judgment, supra note 42, at para.
343. But see Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9/2, Sentencing Judgment at para. 12 (Oct. 17, 2002)
[hereinafter Simic Sentencing Judgment].
47
Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 654 (“The treatment reserved by Dragoljub Kunarac for his
victims was motivated by their being Muslims, as is evidenced by the occasions when the accused told women,
that they would give birth to Serb babies, or that they should ‘enjoy being fucked by a Serb.’”).
48
Id. at paras. 669, 711.
49
See supra text accompanying notes 56-59 for a discussion of the Trial Chamber’s response to Vukovic’s
argument.
45
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the instigation of or with the consent of an official or a person acting in an official capacity.50
In this respect the definition of torture applied in these cases more closely matches that which
is outlined in the ICC Elements of Crimes for torture as a crime against humanity.
c. Prohibited Purpose
The elements of torture utilized by the ad hoc tribunals include a requirement that the
act be committed for a prohibited purpose. The Foca Trial Chamber defined torture as the
intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, physical or mental, aimed at “obtaining
information or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third
person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.”51 The Trial
Chamber stated that there is no requirement that the conduct must be committed solely for a
prohibited purpose. For the prohibited purpose element to be satisfied the Prosecutor must
show that the prohibited purpose was part of the motivation behind the conduct; it does not
have to be the “predominating or sole purpose.”52 This approach was subsequently followed
by the Trial Chambers in Kvočka and Semanza.53
In several rape as torture cases Trial Chambers at the ad hoc tribunals have found
discrimination to be the prohibited purpose because the victims were selected as a result of
their ethnicity. The Foca Trial Chamber found that the deliberate selection of Muslim
victims constituted discrimination.54

In Semanza, the Trial Chamber found that by

encouraging a crowd to rape women because of their ethnicity the accused encouraged the
infliction of pain and suffering for discriminatory purposes.55

50

See Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at paras. 496-97; Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para.
137-41; Semanza Trial Judgment, supra note 42, at para. 342.
51
Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 497.
52
Foca Trial Judgment at para. 486 (“There is no requirement under customary international law that the
conduct must be solely perpetrated for one of the prohibited purposes. As was stated by the Trial Chamber
in the Delalic case, the prohibited purpose must simply be part of the motivation behind the conduct and need
not be the predominating or sole purpose.”).
53
Kvočka Trial Judgment at para. 140-41 (“The Trial Chamber also agrees with the Čelebići Trial Chamber that
the prohibited purposes listed in the Torture Convention as reflected by customary international law “do not
constitute an exhaustive list, and should be regarded as merely representative”, and notes that the Furundzija
Trial Chamber concluded that humiliating the victim or a third person constitutes a prohibited purpose for
torture under international humanitarian law.”); Semanza Trial Judgment, supra note 42, at para. 343 (“There is
no requirement that the conduct be perpetrated solely for one of the prohibited aims.”).
54
Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at paras. 669, 711.
55
Semanza Trial Judgment, supra note 42, at para. 485.
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d. Intent, Torture, and Rape
The Foca Appeals Chamber made an important holding regarding the intent of an
accused charged with torture as a crime against humanity for acts of rape. Vukovic argued
before the Trial Chamber that even if it was proven that he raped FSW-50, it was done out of
sexual urge, not hatred. Thus, the prohibited purpose mens rea requirement for torture was
not met. The Trial Chamber rejected this argument stating:
The prohibited purpose need only be part of the motivation behind the conduct
and need not be the predominant or sole purpose. The Trial Chamber has no
doubt that it was at least a predominant purpose, as the accused obviously
intended to discriminate against the group of which his victim was a member,
i.e. the Muslims, and against his victim in particular.56
This holding was upheld on appeal. The Appeals Chamber stated:
The Appeals Chamber holds that, even if the perpetrator’s motivation is
entirely sexual, it does not follow that the perpetrator does not have the intent
to commit an act of torture or that his conduct does not cause severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, since such pain or suffering is a likely
and logical consequence of his conduct. In view of the definition, it is
important to establish whether a perpetrator intended to act in a way which, in
the normal course of events, would cause severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, to his victims.57
The Appeals Chamber stated that the Prosecutor must establish whether the perpetrator
intended to act in such a way that in the normal course of events would cause severe pain and
suffering.58 The Foca defendants were found to have intended to act in such a way—
committing rape—so as to cause severe pain and suffering and because they acted in
pursuance of a prohibited purpose—discrimination—their conviction for torture based on
rape was upheld.59
e. Pain and Suffering
The Foca Appeals Chamber also had to address an argument from one of the accused
convicted of torture based on rape that a victim’s pain and suffering must be visible, even

56

Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 816.
Foca Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, at para. 153.
58
Id.
59
Id.
57
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long after the commission of the crime.60 The Appeals Chamber dismissed this argument as
erroneous and stated that
[g]enerally speaking, some acts establish per se the suffering of those upon
whom they were inflicted. Rape is obviously such an act. The Trial Chamber
could only conclude that such suffering occurred even without a medical
certificate. Sexual violence necessarily gives rise to severe pain or suffering
whether physical or medical, and in this way justifies its characterisation as
an act of torture.61
The pain and suffering requirement for torture is satisfied once rape has been proven because
rape “necessarily implies such pain or suffering.”62 Additional mental suffering is caused
when a perpetrator forces people to watch a rape being committed. In Kvočka the Trial
Chamber found that the “presence of onlookers, particularly family members, also inflicts
severe mental harm amounting to torture on the person being raped.”63

In 1998, the

Furundzija Trial Chamber held that being forced to watch acquaintances being victimized in
severe sexual attacks was torture for the forced observer.64
f. Other Acts of Sexual Violence as Torture
In 2002, Milan Simic pled guilty to torture as a crime against humanity and acts of
sexual violence formed the basis for the plea. Simic kicked four individuals in their genitals
and repeatedly pulled down the pants of an individual he was beating and threatened to cut of
his penis.65 Simic acknowledged that the Prosecutor would have shown that these acts
inflicted severe mental or physical pain or suffering and that they were committed “for the
purpose of punishing, intimidating or humiliating the victims with discriminatory intent.”66

60

Id. at para. 150.
Id. (emphasis added). In 2001, the Kvočka Trial Chamber referenced the work of the UN Special Rapporteur
on Torture, human rights bodies, and legal scholars and noted that they have listed several acts that are severe
enough to constitute torture per se. These acts include “Beating, sexual violence, prolonged denial of sleep,
food, hygiene, and medical assistance, as well as threats to torture, rape, or kill relatives.” Kvočka Trial
Judgment, supra note 40, at para. 144.
62
Id. at para. 145 (“The jurisprudence of the Tribunals, consistent with the jurisprudence of human rights
bodies, has held that rape may constitute severe pain and suffering amounting to torture, provided that the other
elements of torture, such as a prohibited purpose, are met.”); see, e.g., Foca Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, at
para. 151.
63
Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para. 149.
64
Furundzija Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 257.
65
Simic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 46, at para. 4.
66
Id. at para. 12.
61
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3. Rape
Rape is enumerated as a crime against humanity in Article 5(g) of the ICTY Statute
and Article 3(g) of the ICTR Statute. The Rome Statue similarly lists rape as a crime against
humanity in Article 7(g); however, the Rome Statue goes further and also states that sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity are also crimes against humanity.67 The ad hoc
tribunals have addressed these and other acts of sexual violence within the “other inhumane
acts” category of crimes against humanity. Part III(B)(5) below discusses that jurisprudence.
The elements for the crime against humanity of rape according to the ICC Elements of
Crimes are as follows:
1.

The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of
the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of
the victim with any object or any other part of the body.

2.

The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion,
such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention,
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or
the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving
genuine consent.

3.

The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against a civilian population.

4.

The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
a civilian population.68

The definition of rape before the ad hoc tribunals has evolved in cases that charged
rape as a crime against humanity and as a war crime. To accurately portray the evolution of
this jurisprudence this section discusses cases in which rape was charged as a crime against
humanity and as a war crime. The difference between these two charges relates to the
specific elements that must be established for crimes against humanity and for war crimes.
For example, crimes against humanity must be part of a widespread and systematic attack
67

Rome Statute at art. 7(g).
ICC Elements of Crimes at art. 7(1)(g)-1. Footnotes within this article specify that the “concept of ‘invasion’
is intended to be broad enough to be gender-neutral” and that “It is understood that a person may be incapable of
giving genuine consent if affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity. This footnote also applies to the
corresponding elements of article 7 (1) (g)-3, 5 and 6.”

68
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while war crimes must be closely linked to an armed conflict and the victims must be
protected persons.69
The Trial Chamber in Akayesu defined rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”70

In adopting this

definition the Trial Chamber noted that “rape is a form of aggression and that the central
elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and
body parts.”71

Several months later the Trial Chamber in Čelebići applied the same

definition,72 but the Trial Chamber in Furundzija applied a definition that focuses more on
the “mechanical description of objects and body parts” just one month after the Čelebići
judgment was issued.73 In Furundzija rape is defined as:
(i)

(ii)

the sexual penetration, however slight:
(a)

of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the
perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or

(b)

of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;

by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third
person.74

The different approaches used in Akayesu and Furundzija were discussed in Musema and the
Musema Trial Chamber noted that Akayesu adopts a conceptual approach while Furundzija
utilizes a mechanical definition. The Musema Trial Chamber concluded that the conceptual
approach of Akayesu was preferable to the definition set forth in Furundzija because of the
“dynamic ongoing evolution of the understanding of rape and the incorporation of this
understanding into principles of international law.”75

The Akayesu definition “clearly

encompasses all the conduct” described in the Furundzija definition and such an approach
was deemed to be better for accommodating evolving norms of criminal justice.76
The focus on coercion and force in the Furundzija definition was directly challenged
in Foca. The Foca Trial Chamber held that the Furundzija definition was “more narrowly

69

See, e.g., Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para. 127.
Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 6, at para. 598.
71
Id. at para. 597.
72
Čelebići Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 479 (Rape is “a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances that are coercive.”).
73
See Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 6, at para. 597.
74
Furundzija Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 185.
75
Musema Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 228.
76
Id.
70
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stated than required by international law.”77 The Foca Trial Chamber concluded that lack of
voluntary consent was the key aspect of rape. Therefore in requiring the sexual penetration to
take place by coercion, force, or threat of force, the Furundzija Trial Chamber did “not refer
to other factors that would render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual or nonvoluntary on the part of the victim.”78 Therefore the Foca Trial Chamber adopted the
following definition of rape:
the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim
by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such
sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this
purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will,
assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the
intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs
without the consent of the victim.79
The Foca Appeals Chamber concurred with this definition and it has been applied by the
Trial Chambers in Kvočka, Kamuhanda, Semanza, Stakic, Nikolic, Kajelijeli, Gacumbitsi, and
Muhimana.80 The ICC Elements of Crimes similarly uses a more mechanical definition, but
it does require the sexual penetration to occur by force, threat of force, or coercion, by taking
advantage of a coercive environment, or against a person incapable of giving genuine
consent. Thus the ICC definition covers a range of ways in which sexual penetration can be
non-consensual.
The Kvočka Trial Chamber stated that rape is a “violation of sexual autonomy,” and
the Foca definition of rape focuses on sexual autonomy and various ways in which it can be
violated.81 In order for sexual activity to constitute rape it must fall within one of the
following two categories:
(i)

the sexual activity must be accompanied by force or threat of force to

77

Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 438.
Id.
79
Id. at para. 460 (emphasis added).
80
Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para. 177; Kamuhanda Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 49597, 707 (Accused not guilty for the crime against humanity of rape because the witnesses who testified
regarding the rapes did not witness the rapes themselves, but were told about them after the fact); Semanza Trial
Judgment, supra note 42, at para. 344-46 (Accused not guilty for rape as a crime against humanity because
indictment provided insufficient notice to Accused); Stakic Trial Judgment at para. 755; Prosecutor v. Nikolic,
Case No. IT-94-2, Sentencing Judgment at para. 113 (Dec. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Nikolic Sentencing Judgment]
(stating “the perpetrator intended the sexual penetration and knew that it was committed against the will of the
victim.”); Kajelijeli Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 915; Gacumbitsi Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at
para. 321, 325 (noting “[u]nder such circumstances, the utterances made by the Accused to the effect that in case
of resistance the victims should be killed in an atrocious manner, and the fact that rape victims were attacked by
those they were fleeing from, adequately establish the victims’ lack of consent to the rapes.”).
81
Foca Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, at para. 128; Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para. 177.
78
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the victim or a third party;
(ii)

the sexual activity must be accompanied by force or a variety of other
specified circumstances which made the victim particularly vulnerable
or negated her ability to make an informed refusal; or the sexual
activity must occur without the consent of the victim.82

The mens rea requirement for rape is “the intent to effect a sexual penetration and the
knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”83
While the Foca definition is more “mechanical” than the Akayesu definition, the
Muhimana Trial Chamber stated that the Akayesu and Foca definitions of rape are not
incompatible and it endorsed “the conceptual definition of rape established in Akayesu, which
encompasses the elements set out in Kunarac [Foca].”84
a. Evidence of Resistance
The accused in Foca appealed their rape convictions contending that the definition of
rape adopted by the Trial Chamber did not include two necessary elements. One, that the
sexual penetration took place by force or threat of force, and two that the victim’s resistance
was continuous or genuine.85 On the first point, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial
Chamber’s definition, which does not require the use or threat of force, but instead requires
voluntary consent.86 On the second point, the Appellants argued that “nothing short of
continuous resistance provides adequate notice to the perpetrator that his attentions are
unwanted.”87 The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument finding it “wrong on the law and
absurd on the facts.”88 The Appeals Chamber in Kvočka similarly rejected a request by an
appellant to require a showing of “permanent and lasting resistance” by the victim and
“simultaneous use of force or threat.”89
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Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para. 177.
Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 179; see also Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para.
177.
84
Muhimana Trial Judgment, supra note 17, at para. 551 (“The Chamber takes the view that the Akayesu
definition and the Kunarac elements are not incompatible or substantially different in their application. Whereas
Akayesu referred broadly to a ‘physical invasion of a sexual nature’, Kunarac went on to articulate the
parameters of what would constitute a physical invasion of a sexual nature amounting to rape.”).
85
Foca Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, at para. 125.
86
See text accompanying notes 90-93 for an additional discussion of the relationship between the use of force
and consent.
87
Id. at para. 128.
88
Id.
89
Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. Case No. IT-98-30/1, Appeals Judgment at paras. 393, 395 (Feb 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Kvočka Appeals Judgment] (noting that the continuous resistance requirement was wrong on the
law and absurd on the facts as the Foca Appeals Chamber stated).
83
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b. Consent
The Foca Appeals Chamber stated that the Foca Trial Judgment did not “disavow the
Tribunal’s earlier jurisprudence,” but rather sought to explain the relationship between force
and consent.90 The Appeals Chamber clarified that
there are “factors ‘other than force’ which would render an act of sexual
penetration non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the victim”. A
narrow focus on force or threat of force could permit perpetrators to evade
liability for sexual activity to which the other party had not consented by
taking advantage of coercive circumstances without relying on physical
force.91
The Appeals Chamber went on to note that the circumstances giving rise to rape charges as
crimes against humanity or war crimes “will be almost universally coercive” such that “true
consent will not be possible.”92 The Trial Chambers in both Čelebići and Furundzija made
similar findings.93
4. Persecution
Persecution is a crime against humanity within the jurisdiction of the ICC, ICTY, and
ICTR based on Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, Article 5(h) of the ICTY Statute, and
Article 3(h) of the ICTR Statute. The ICC Elements of Crimes defines the elements of
persecution as follows:
1.

The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or
more persons of fundamental rights.

2.

The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the
identity of a group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity
as such.
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Foca Appeals Judgment at para. 129.
Id.
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Id. at para. 130; see also id. at para. 132 (“For the most part, the Appellants in this case were convicted of
raping women held in de facto military headquarters, detention centres and apartments maintained as soldiers’
residences. As the most egregious aspect of the conditions, the victims were considered the legitimate sexual
prey of their captors. Typically, the women were raped by more than one perpetrator and with a regularity that is
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Such detentions amount to circumstances that were so coercive as to negate any possibility of consent.” ).
93
Čelebići Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 495 (noting that coercive conditions are inherent in armed
conflicts); Furundzija Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 271 (“any form of captivity vitiates consent”).
The facts in Gacumbitsi caused the Trial Chamber to reach a similar conclusion. The Accused stated that if the
victims resisted they should be “killed in an atrocious manner” and the rape victims were attacked by those from
whom they were fleeing. These factors caused the Trial Chamber to find that the rape victims did not consent.
Gacumbitsi Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 325.
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3.

Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, of the Statute, or
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law.

4.

The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in
article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court.

5.

The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against a civilian population.

6.

The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
a civilian population.

Persecution before the ad hoc tribunals has an additional element—it must be
committed with an intent to discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds. A footnote
to Article 7(1)(h)(4) of the ICC Elements of Crimes suggests that this element does not exist
before the ICC, stating that “[i]t is understood that no additional mental element is necessary
for this element other than that inherent in element 6.94
The Trial Chamber in Kupreskić held that persecution is “the gross or blatant denial,
on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or
treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5 [crimes
against humanity].”95

Other courts have included murder, extermination, torture,

enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, rape, and other serious acts like those enumerated in
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute as underlying acts for persecution.96
This definition evolved over time and the Trial Chamber in Stakic restated the “settled
definition” of persecution as an act or omission that “1. discriminates in fact and which
denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in customary international or treaty
law (the actus reus); and 2. was carried out deliberately with the intent to discriminate on
political, racial and religious grounds (mens rea).”97
There have been several ICTY cases in which accused have been charged and
convicted of persecution based on rape and acts of sexual violence. For example, Steven
Todorović pled guilty to one count of persecution and the underlying acts supporting this
94

ICC Elements of Crimes at art. 7(1)(h)(4) n.22.
Prosecutor v. Kupreskić, et al., Case No. IT-95-16, Judgment at para. 631 (Jan. 14, 2000) [hereinafter
Kupreskić Trial Judgment].
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Id. at para. 615(b), n.895.
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Stakic Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 732 (citing Vasiljević Trial Judgment at para. 244).
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charge included sexual assaults on Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims detained in various
detention camps in and around the Bosanksi Šamac municipality.98 General Radislav Krstić
was charged with persecution based on the cruel and inhumane treatment of Bosnian Muslim
civilians. The cruel and inhumane treatment consisted of severe beatings, lack of food and
water, rape, and killings.99 The Trial Chamber found Krstić liable for the murders, rapes,
beatings, and abuses that took place within what they determined to be a criminal enterprise
at Potočari.100 Biljana Plavsic pled guilty to persecution and the underlying acts were cruel or
inhumane treatment, which consisted of acts of sexual violence that took place in Zvornik at
the Ekonomija farm and the Čelopek camp.101 In Stakic, the Trial Chamber found that acts of
sexual assault and rape were committed and these acts supported the persecution charge.102
Nikolic pled guilty to persecution and the underlying acts supporting this conviction were
sexual violence and aiding and abetting rape. Nikolic had been separately charged with
sexual violence and aiding and abetting rape but he entered a guilty plea to persecution,
which the Plea Agreement stated was based on the acts individually charged in the
indictment.103
The Trial Chamber in Kvočka held that sexual violence can constitute persecution
when it is committed with the requisite discriminatory intent, yet discriminatory intent will
not have to be shown for a successful persecution conviction at the ICC.104
5. Other inhumane acts
Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction over “other inhumane
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health.” The ICC Elements of Crimes states that the elements for other
inhumane acts are as follows:
1.

The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act.

2.

Such act was of a character similar to any other act referred to in article
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Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Second Amended Indictment at para. 34 (Mar. 25, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Sentencing Judgment at para. 9 (July 31, 2001) (Todorović agreed
that he ordered six men to “perform fellatio on each other at the police station in Bosanski Samac on three
different occasions in May and June 1992.”).
99
Krstić Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 517, 45-46 (rapes).
100
Id. at para. 617.
101
Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1, Sentencing Judgment at para. 29 (Feb. 27, 2003).
102
Stakic Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 818.
103
Nikolic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 80, at paras. 118-19.
104
Kvočka Trial Judgment at para. 186.
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7, paragraph 1, of the Statute.
3.

The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established
the character of the act.

4.

The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against a civilian population.

5.

The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
a civilian population.

Other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity are within the ad hoc tribunals’
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5(i) of the ICTY Statute and Article 3(i) of the ICTR Statute.
The Kayishema Trial Chamber has stated that in relation to the ICTR Statute other inhumane
acts include those
that are of similar gravity and seriousness to the enumerated acts of murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or
persecution on political, racial and religious grounds. These will be acts or
omissions that deliberately cause serious mental or physical suffering or injury
or constitute a serious attack on human dignity.105
Furthermore there must be a “nexus between the inhumane act and the great suffering or
serious injury to mental or physical health of the victim.”106 Other inhumane acts must be
committed deliberately.
[An] accused may be held liable under these circumstances only where, at the
time of the act, the accused had the intention to inflict serious mental suffering
on the third party, or where the accused knew that his act was likely to cause
serious mental suffering and was reckless as to whether such suffering would
result.107
The Bagilishema Trial Chamber utilized the same definition of other inhumane acts.108 Both
chambers stated that whether a specific act falls within the category of other inhumane acts is
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Kayishema Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 151.
Id.
107
Id. at para. 153.
108
The Bagilishema Trial Chamber stated that other inhumane acts include
acts that are of similar gravity and seriousness to the enumerated acts of murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or persecution on
political, racial, and religious grounds. These will be acts or omissions that deliberately cause
serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitute a serious attack on human dignity.
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment at para. 92 (June 7, 2001) [hereinafter
Bagilishema Trial Judgment].
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a decision that must be made on a case-by-case basis.109 Applying the Kayishema definition
of other inhumane acts, the Niyitegeka Trial Chamber found the Accused guilty of other
inhumane acts for two acts of sexual violence.110 The Accused rejoiced when an individual
was killed, decapitated, and castrated. The victim’s skull was pierced through the ears with a
spike and his genitals were hung on the spike in public view.111 The Accused also ordered
Interahamwe to undress the body of a recently shot Tutsi woman, to sharpen a piece of wood,
and to insert the wood into her genitalia.112 The Trial Chamber concluded that these acts are
“acts of seriousness comparable to other acts enumerated in the Article, and would cause
mental suffering to civilians, in particular, Tutsi civilians, and constitute a serious attack on
the human dignity of the Tutsi community as a whole.”113
The Trial Chamber in Kajelijeli applied the Kayishema definition of other inhumane
acts and concluded that
[c]utting a woman’s breast off and licking it, and piercing a woman’s sexual
organs with a spear are nefarious acts of a comparable gravity to the other acts
listed as crimes against humanity, which would clearly cause great mental
suffering to any members of the Tutsi community who observed them.114
While the accused was not convicted for these acts, the case provides an example of the types
of acts that the ad hoc tribunals have found to constitute other inhumane acts.115 Other
examples of sexual violence that have been found to constitute other inhumane acts are
forcing prisoners to perform oral sexual acts on each other, forcing a prisoner to bite off the
testicle of another prisoner,116 the forced undressing of a woman outside in a public area
after making her sit in mud, the forced undressing and public marching of a woman in a
public area, and the forced undressing of women and making them perform physical
exercises in a public area naked.117
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Kayishema Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at paras. 151; Bagilishema Trial Judgment, supra note 108, at para.

92.
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Niyitegeka Trial Judgment, supra note 16, at para. 467.
Id. at para. 462.
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Id. at para. 463.
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Id. at para. 465.
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Kajelijeli Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 936.
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The Trial Chamber found that there was no evidence that he was present during these acts or ordered that
they take place. The Trial Chamber further concluded that the Prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable
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preparation, or execution of the acts. Id. at para. 937.
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Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion & Judgment at para. 198 (May 7, 1997) [hereinafter Tadic
Trial Judgment].
117
Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 6, at para. 697.
111

29

As noted above, the Rome Statute enumerates more sexual violence crimes than the
ICTY and ICTR Statutes and Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute covers “any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity.” Consequently acts of sexual violence that are not
specifically enumerated in the Rome Statute may have to be charged as Article 7(1)(g)
crimes, rather than Article 7(1)(k) (other inhumane acts) crimes. The Statute for the Special
Court for Sierra Leone is similar to the Rome Statute and Article 2(g) grants the Special
Court jurisdiction over “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and
any other form of sexual violence.”118 In a May 2005 decision, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (“SCSL”) held that other acts of sexual violence must be charged as Article 2(g)
crimes and not as Article 2(i) (other inhumane acts) crimes. The Trial Chamber in the Civil
Defence Forces (“CDF”) case held that
in light of the separate and distinct residual category of sexual offenses under
Article 2(g), it is impermissible to allege acts of sexual violence (other than
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy) under Article
2(i) [other inhumane acts] since ‘other inhumane acts’, even if residual, must
logically be restrictively interpreted as covering only acts of a non-sexual
nature amounting to an affront to human dignity.119
The Trial Chamber concluded that the
clear legislative intent behind the statutory formula “any other form of sexual
violence” in Article 2(g) is the creation of a category of offenses of sexual
violence of a character that do not amount to any of the earlier enumerated
sexual crimes, and that to permit such other forms of sexual violence to be
charged under “other inhumane acts” offends the rule against multiplicity and
uncertainty.120
The SCSL was faced with this issue because the CDF indictment charged the accused with
other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity, but did not charge them with violations of
Article 2(g). The indictment did not mention acts of sexual violence and the Chamber denied
the Prosecutor’s motion to amend the indictment to add Article 2(g) charges for sexual
violence. In light of this denial the Prosecutor sought leave to introduce evidence of sexual
violence under the Article 2(i) (other inhumane acts) charge. This motion was denied. The
Trial Chamber concluded that the defendants did not have adequate notice that they would
118

Letter Dated 6 March 2002 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., Attachment: Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, at 29, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246
(2002), available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/Statute.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2005) [hereinafter
SCSL Statute].
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Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana, Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Reasoned Majority Decision on
Prosecution Motion for a Ruling on the Admissibility of Evidence, at para. 19(iii)(b) (May 24, 2005) (filed June
22, 2005) [hereinafter CDF Case].
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Id. at para. 19(iii)(c).
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have to address acts of sexual violence because such acts were not mentioned in the
indictment.121 In a separate concurring opinion the presiding judge, Judge Itoe, stated that “a
failure to plead in the Indictment, material facts and elements of offenses which the
Prosecution intends to rely on to prove it, renders it vague, unspecific, and defective.”122 The
Chamber concluded that
nothing in the record seems to support the Prosecution’s assertion that the
evidentiary material under reference had been disclosed to the Defence “in
some form” over 12 months ago and even if there were, there is nothing in the
Consolidated Indictment, the principal accusatory instrument, to sustain such
an assertion.123
The Trial Chamber’s insistence that the indictment provide notice as to the specific acts
giving rise to the other inhumane acts charge is contrary to the jurisprudence of the ICTY and
ICTR. The indictment in Kayishema did not specify the acts, or the nature of the acts, that
the Prosecutor relied upon for the other inhumane acts charge.124

The Trial Chamber

concluded that it was therefore “incumbent upon the Prosecution to rectify the vagueness of
the counts during its presentation of evidence.”125 Citing Blaskic, the Trial Chamber noted,
“[i]ndeed the question of knowing whether the allegations appearing in the Indictment are
vague will, in the final analysis, be settled at Trial.”126
The SCSL’s decision has two implications for the ICC. The first is that acts of sexual
violence may have to be charged as Article 7(1)(g) crimes and not “other inhumane acts.”
The second is what means are available for the Prosecutor to give accused adequate notice of
the underlying acts relied upon for the charges in the indictment. The ICC will have to
decide whether those acts have to be specified in the indictment as held by the SCSL or
whether the Prosecutor can provide the necessary details during the course of the trial as held
by the ICTY and ICTR.
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C. War Crimes
Article 8 of the Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction over war crimes. Article
8(2)(a) addresses grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (“Geneva
Conventions), Article 8(2)(b) covers “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict,” Article 8(2)(c) deals with serious violations of
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for non-international
armed conflicts, and Article 8(2)(e) covers “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character.”
The ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdictional mandate similarly covers war crimes. Article 2 of
the ICTY Statute grants the ICTY jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions.

Article 3 states that the “International Tribunal shall have the power to

prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war.” The Tadic Appeals Chamber held
that Article 3 “functions as a residual clause designed to ensure that no serious violation of
international humanitarian law is taken away from the jurisdiction of the International
Tribunal.”127 Thus violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (“Common
Article 3”), which are not specifically mentioned in the ICTY Statute, are within the ICTY’s
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3.128
Article 4 of the ICTR Statute grants the ICTR jurisdiction over serious violations of
Common Article 3 and of Additional Protocol II of 8 June 1977. The grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions only apply to international conflicts therefore the ICTR does not have
jurisdiction over grave breaches.
Acts of sexual violence have been charged as various war crimes, such as torture
pursuant to Articles 2(b) and 3 of the ICTY Statute and Article 4(a) of the ICTR Statute, cruel
treatment pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTY Statute and Article 4(a) of the ICTR Statute,
outrages upon personal dignity pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTY Statute and Article 4(e) of
the ICTR Statute, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health
pursuant to Article 2(c) of the ICTY Statute, and inhuman treatment based on Article 2(b) of
the ICTY Statute.
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Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-95-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction at para. 91 (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Jurisdiction Appeal].
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In Furundzija the accused was charged with torture and rape as violations of Common Article 3 of the
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Motion to Dismiss Counts 13 and 14 of the Indictment (Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction), at para. 6(d) (May
29, 1998).

32

1. Torture
The ICC has jurisdiction over torture as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions
and as a serious violation of Common Article 3. The ICC Elements of Crimes lists the
elements for torture as a grave breach as follows:
1.

The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering
upon one or more persons.

2.

The perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for such purposes as:
obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation or
coercion or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.

3.

Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949.

4.

The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established
that protected status.

5.

The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conflict.

6.

The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the
existence of an armed conflict.129

The ICTY Statute, but not the ICTR Statute, grants the ICTY jurisdiction over grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions. As can be seen by element five noted above, grave breaches
must take place within the context of an international conflict. As the conflict in Rwanda was
internal, the ICTY provides the only jurisprudence on grave breaches. There has been one
significant ICTY case in which acts of sexual violence have been charged as grave breaches
and convictions were obtained—Čelebići. In Čelebići the accused were charged with torture,
inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health
for rapes and acts of sexual violence. The elements of torture as a grave breach before the
ICTY are as follows:

129

(i)

There must be an act or omission that causes severe pain or suffering,
whether mental or physical,

(ii)

which is inflicted intentionally,

(iii)

and for such purposes as obtaining information or a confession from
the victim, or a third person, punishing the victim for an act he or she

ICC Elements of Crimes at art. 8(2)(a)(ii)-1.
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or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed,
intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind,
and such act or omission being committed by, or at the instigation of, or with
the consent or acquiescence of, an official or other person acting in an official
capacity.130
As noted in the discussion of torture as a crime against humanity, the official actor
requirement is now understood to be limited to prosecutions pursuant to the Torture
Convention. As a grave breach, there is the additional requirement that the acts take place
within the context of an armed conflict and that the victims be protected persons under the
Geneva Conventions.131
Pursuant to the ICC Elements of Crimes torture is a serious violation of Common
Article 3 when:
1.

The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering
upon one or more persons.

2.

The perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for such purposes as:
obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation or
coercion or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.

3.

Such person or persons were either hors de combat, or were civilians,
medical personnel or religious personnel taking no active part in the
hostilities.

4.

The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established
this status.

5.

The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
armed conflict not of an international character.

6.

The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the
existence of an armed conflict.

The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals establishes that the elements of torture as a serious
violation of Common Article 3 of are as follows:
(i)

The infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental.
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Čelebići Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 494.
Id. at para. 201; Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 23, at para. 80; Tadic Jurisdiction Appeal, supra note
127, at para. 84.
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(ii)

The act or omission must be intentional.

The act or omission must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at
punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at
discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.132
As with torture as a crime against humanity, the early ad hoc tribunal cases required that the
perpetrator be an official or that the perpetrator act “at the instigation of, or with the consent
or acquiescence of, an official or other person acting in an official capacity.”133 The 2001
Foca holding, which was upheld by the Appeals Chamber in 2002,134 stating that pursuant to
customary international law, the elements of torture do not include an official actor
requirement is equally applicable to torture as a crime against humanity, a grave breach of the
Geneva Conventions and a serious violation of Common Article 3.135
a. Rape as Torture
As with torture as a crime against humanity, the ad hoc tribunals have concluded that
rape and other acts of sexual violence can constitute torture as a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions or a serious violation of Common Article 3 if the elements of torture are
satisfied.136 As noted by the Furundzija Trial Chamber,
Rape is resorted to either by the interrogator himself or by other persons
associated with the interrogation of a detainee, as a means of punishing,
intimidating, coercing or humiliating the victim, or obtaining information, or a
confession, from the victim or a third person. In human rights law, in such
situations the rape may amount to torture, as demonstrated by the finding of
the European Court of Human Rights in Aydin and the Inter-American Court
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Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 497. The Kvočka Trial Chamber adopted a similar definition:
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Torture consists of the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental;
(ii)
the act or omission must be intentional; and
(iii)
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or a confession, punishing, intimidating, humiliating, or coercing the victim or a third person,
or discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.
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torture.”).
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of Human Rights in Meijia.137
Čelebići was the first case in which an accused was convicted of torture for committing rape.
The Trial Chamber concluded that Delic’s rape of Grozdana Cecez constituted torture
because it caused Cecez to suffer severe mental pain and suffering, the rape was intentional,
and the rape was committed for several prohibited purposes. It was later held in Foca that
once rape has been proven, the pain and suffering element of torture has also been proven.138
The Čelebići Trial Chamber found that because Cecez lived “in a state of constant
fear and depression, suicidal tendencies, and exhaustion, both mental and physical,” there
could be no question that she suffered severe mental pain and suffering.139

This Trial

Chamber also found that the “acts of vaginal penetration by the penis under circumstances
that were coercive, quite clearly constitute rape” and that they were committed
intentionally.140

The prohibited purposes included obtaining information about the

whereabouts of the victim’s husband, punishing the victim for failing to provide the requested
information, coercing the victim to provide the desired information, punishing the victim for
her husband’s alleged actions,141 intimidating the victim and other inmates in the prison-camp
where the rape took place,142 and finally discrimination because the specific violent act
committed—rape—was chosen because of the victim’s gender.143
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the commander of the prison-camp, the guards, other people who worked in the prison-camp and most
importantly, the inmates, evidences Mr. Delic’s purpose of seeking to intimidate not only the victim but also
other inmates, by creating an atmosphere of fear and powerlessness.”).
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Id. (“In addition, the violence suffered by Ms. Cecez in the form of rape, was inflicted upon her by Delic
because she is a woman. As discussed above, this represents a form of discrimination which constitutes a
prohibited purpose for the offence of torture.”).
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In Furundzija the rape of Witness A constituted torture because the accused
intentionally raped Witness A to obtain information. The accused also forced Witness D to
watch the sexual attack of Witness A in order to obtain information about his alleged betrayal
of the Croatian Defence Council and his assistance to Witness A and her children. The Trial
Chamber concluded that this constituted torture. Forcing Witness D to “watch sexual attacks
on a woman, in particular, a woman whom he knew as a friend, caused him severe physical
and mental suffering” and the act was committed for a prohibited purpose.144
b. Mens rea
The Foca Appeals Chamber holdings regarding intent and torture are equally
applicable for torture as a crime against humanity, a grave breach, and a serious violation of
Common Article 3. Thus
even if the perpetrator’s motivation is entirely sexual, it does not follow that
the perpetrator does not have the intent to commit an act of torture or that his
conduct does not cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
since such pain or suffering is a likely and logical consequence of his conduct.
In view of the definition, it is important to establish whether a perpetrator
intended to act in a way which, in the normal course of events, would cause
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, to his victims.145
2. Cruel treatment
Cruel treatment as a serious violation of Common Article 3 is within the ICC’s
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute. The elements stated in the ICC
Elements of Crimes are as follows:
1.

The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering
upon one or more persons.

2.

Such person or persons were either hors de combat, or were civilians,
medical personnel, or religious personnel taking no active part in the
hostilities.

3.

The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established
this status.

4.

The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
armed conflict not of an international character.146
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Furundzija Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 267.
Foca Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, at para. 153.
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The ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction over this crime is based on Article 3 of the ICTY Statute
and Article 4(a) of the ICTR Statute. Cruel treatment as outlined by the ad hoc tribunals
consists of:
1.

an intentional act or omission,

2.

that is deliberate and not accidental,

3.

which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or
constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.147

There have been three significant cases in which acts of sexual violence have been charged as
cruel treatment as a serious violation of Common Article 3. These cases are Čelebići, Simic,
and Semanza.
In Čelebići Mucic was convicted of cruel treatment for his role in tying an electric
cord around the genitals of prisoners and forcing prisoners to perform fellatio on one
another.148 Delic, another accused in Čelebići, was acquitted of cruel treatment for the rape
of Grozdana Cecez because it was included as a lesser offense to torture as a grave breach of
the Geneva Conventions and torture as a serious violation of Common Article 3, both of
which he was convicted.149
Simic was charged with cruel treatment for kicking four individuals in their genitals
and repeatedly pulling down the pants of one individual while he beat him and threatening to
cut off his penis.150 Simic pled guilty, but only to the torture as a crime against humanity
charges.151
In Semanza the facts that gave rise to the cruel treatment charge were the same facts
underlying the charges of rape as a crime against humanity and torture as a crime against
humanity.

Two of the three judges in the Trial Chamber found sufficient evidence to

conclude that Semanza was responsible for the rape of Victim A and Victim B. Thus
convictions on the rape as a crime against humanity and torture as a crime against humanity
charges were entered.

One of the two judges concluded, however, that it would be

“impermissible to convict on Count 13 [cruel treatment] because of the apparent ideal
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Čelebići Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 552.
Id. at para. 24 & Part IV.
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Id.
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Simic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 46, at para. 11.
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Id. at para. 3, 10.
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concurrence of the crime charged therein with rape, torture, and murder as crimes against
humanity charged in Counts 10, 11, and 12.”152 This conclusion was overturned on appeal.
Cumulative convictions under different statutory provisions for the same conduct are
permissible if the statutory provisions have materially distinct elements that are not contained
in the other.153 “An element is materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact
not required by the other.”154 The Semanza Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial
Chamber’s failure to enter a conviction for the cruel treatment count was an error. The
Appeals Chamber concluded that Semanza’s “convictions for crimes against humanity
necessitated proof of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, whereas
convictions for war crimes require that the offences charged be closely related to the armed
conflict.”155 The Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber found the necessary nexus
was established such that the necessary elements of the crimes against humanity and the
serious violations of Common Article 3 were established. To remedy the Trial Chamber’s
error, the Appeals Chamber entered a conviction for Count 13 (cruel treatment) of the
indictment.156
3. Outrages upon personal dignity
The ICC has jurisdiction over outrages upon personal dignity, including humiliating
and degrading treatment as a serious violation of Common Article 3 based on Article
8(2)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute. The elements of this crime are:
1.

The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the dignity
of one or more persons.*

2.

The severity of the humiliation, degradation or other violation was of
such degree as to be generally recognized as an outrage upon personal
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Semanza Trial Judgment, supra note 42, at para. 552.
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Judgment, at para. 368 (May 20, 2005) [hereinafter
Semanza Appeals Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, at paras. 361, 363
(Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Musema Appeals Judgment] (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al., Case No. IT-9621-A, Judgment at paras. 412-13, (Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Čelebići Appeals Judgment]; see also Prosecutor
v. Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-A, ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, at para. 542 (Dec. 13,
2004) [hereinafter Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment]. Part III(D) contains a more detailed discussion on
cumulative convictions.
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Semanza Appeals Judgment, supra note 153, at para. 368 (quoting Musema Appeals Judgment, paras 361,
363 (quoting Čelebići Appeals Judgment, paras 412-13)). See also Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment, supra
note 153, at para. 542.
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Semanza Appeals Judgment, supra note 153, at para. 369.
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Id. at para. 371.
*
For this crime “persons” can include dead persons. It is understood that the victim need not personally be
aware of the existence of the humiliation or degradation or other violation. This element takes into account
relevant aspects of the cultural background of the victim.
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dignity.
3.

Such person or persons were either hors de combat, or were civilians,
medical personnel or religious personnel taking no active part in the
hostilities.

4.

The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established
this status.

5.

The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
armed conflict not of an international character.

6.

The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the
existence of an armed conflict.

Outrages upon personal dignity are within the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute and Article 4(e) of the ICTR Statute. The ICTR Statute
specifically grants jurisdiction over “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.”157
The ICTY’s jurisdiction over this crime is based on Common Article 3, which prohibits
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”158
While the ICTR included “rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”
within the outrages upon personal dignity category, the Rome Statute enumerates these and
other acts of sexual violence separately in Article 8(2)(e)(vi). This article grants the ICC
jurisdiction over “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, . . . enforced
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.”159
The elements for establishing outrages upon personal dignity before the ad hoc
tribunals are
1.

that the accused intentionally committed or participated in an act or
omission which would be generally considered to cause serious
humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a serious attack on human
dignity, and

2.

that he knew that the act or omission could have that effect.160

157

ICTR Statute at art. 4(e).
See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War at art. 33 (Aug.
12, 1949), 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Foca Trial Judgment at para. 436 (“The jurisdiction to charge rape as an outrage
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The Foca Appeals Chamber affirmed this definition rejecting the appellant’s contention that
the Trial Chamber should have provided a list of acts that constitute an outrage upon personal
dignity and that the appropriate mens rea requirement is that the perpetrator knew his act or
omission would cause serious humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a serious attack on
human dignity.161
An earlier ICTY case stated that with regard to outrages upon personal dignity
[i]t is not necessary for the act to directly harm the physical or mental wellbeing of the victim. It is enough that the act causes real and lasting suffering
to the individual arising from the humiliation or ridicule. The degree of
suffering which the victim endures will obviously depend on his/her
temperament.162
The Foca Trial Chamber took issue with this aspect of the definition, stating
the Trial Chamber would not agree with any indication from the passage
above that this humiliation or degradation must cause “lasting suffering” to the
victim. So long as the humiliation or degradation is real and serious, the Trial
Chamber can see no reason why it would also have to be “lasting”. In the
view of the Trial Chamber, it is not open to regard the fact that a victim has
recovered or is overcoming the effects of such an offence as indicating of
itself that the relevant acts did not constitute an outrage upon personal dignity.
Obviously, if the humiliation and suffering caused is only fleeting in nature, it
may be difficult to accept that it is real and serious. However this does not
suggest that any sort of minimum temporal requirement of the effects of an
outrage upon personal dignity is an element of the offence.163
The Foca approach was followed by the Kvočka Trial Chamber.164
The acts that gave rise to the outrages upon personal dignity charge in Foca included
holding four young women in an apartment and forcing them to dance naked on a table while

161
Foca Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, at paras. 163, 165. The Trial Chamber had specifically held that “an
accused must know that his act or omission is of that character – i.e., that it could cause serious humiliation,
degradation or affront to human dignity. This is not the same as requiring that the accused knew of the actual
consequences of the act.” Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 512. This conclusion was upheld by the
Appeals Chamber.
162
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Judgment at para. 56 (June 25, 1999).
163
Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 501.
164
The Kvočka Trial Chamber stated
This Trial Chamber agrees with the Kunarac Judgment that the act or omission need not cause
lasting suffering; it is sufficient if the act or omission “would be generally considered to cause
serious humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity.” Kunarac
further found that the mens rea element of the offence did not require any specific intent from
the perpetrator to humiliate, ridicule, or degrade the victim, but that it was enough if the
perpetrator knew that his or her act or omission “could cause serious humiliation, degradation
or affront to human dignity.”
Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para. 168.
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one of the accused watched, selling one woman to a man for 200 deutschmarks and another
two women for 500 deutschmarks, and handing one woman over to two men.165 Rape and
other acts of sexual violence were the basis for charges of outrages upon personal dignity in
Kamuhanda, Semanza, and Cesic. The Trial Chamber concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to support the charges in both Kamuhanda and Semanza. Cesic pled guilty to
humiliating and degrading treatment as a serious violation of Common Article 3 for forcing
two Muslim detainees to perform fellatio on each other.166 Consequently these three cases do
not address the elements of outrages upon personal dignity as a serious violation of Common
Article 3.
In Musema the Trial Chamber enumerated the elements of humiliating and degrading
treatment pursuant to Article 4(e) of the ICTR Statute. The elements include
[s]ubjecting victims to treatment designed to subvert their self-regard. Like
outrages upon personal dignity, these offences may be regarded as a lesser
forms [sic] of torture; moreover ones in which the motives required for torture
would not be required, nor would it be required that the acts be committed
under state authority.167
The elements of rape as a crime against humanity are equally applicable for rape as an Article
4(e) offense.168 Finally, indecent assault occurs when an individual causes “the infliction of
pain or injury by an act which was of a sexual nature and inflicted by means of coercion,
force, threat or intimidation and was non-consensual.”169
a. Mens rea
On appeal the Appellant in Foca argued that the Prosecutor had not proven that he
acted with the intention to humiliate his victims. He argued that his “objective was of an
exclusively sexual nature.”170 The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument concluding that
“the Trial Chamber properly demonstrated that the crime of outrages upon personal dignity
requires only . . . knowledge of the ‘possible’ consequences of the charged act or
omission.”171 With regard to the facts at issue the Appeals Chamber stated,
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Foca Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, at paras. 16-17.
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[s]ince the nature of the acts committed by the Appellant against FWS-75,
FWS-87, A.S. and A.B. undeniably reaches the objective threshold for the
crime of outrages upon personal dignity set out in the Trial Judgement, the
Trial Chamber correctly concluded that any reasonable person would have
perceived his acts “to cause serious humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a
serious attack on human dignity”. Therefore, it appears highly improbable
that the Appellant was not, at the very least, aware that his acts could have
such an effect.172
b. Rape173
The Foca Appeals Chamber holdings regarding force or threat of force and consent,
which are discussed in Part III(B)(3) (rape as a crime against humanity) also apply to rape
charges under outrages upon personal dignity as a serious violation of Common Article 3.
4. Wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health
Article 8(2)(a)(iii) grants the ICC jurisdiction over wilfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. The ICC
Elements of Crimes states that the elements for this offence are as follows:
1.

The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or
serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.

2.

Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949.

3.

The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established
that protected status.

4.

The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conflict.

5.

The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the
existence of an armed conflict.174

The ICTY has jurisdiction over this offense pursuant to Article 2(c) of the ICTY Statute, and
because this is a grave breach that must take place within the context of an international
armed conflict, the ICTR does not have jurisdiction over this offense. The ICTY has held
that wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health requires:
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1.

an intentional act or omission

2

that, when judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental,

3.

which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury.175

As a grave breach the act must also take place within the context of an international armed
conflict and the victim must be a protected person pursuant to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949. Acts that qualify as “wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health” include acts that “do not meet the purposive requirements for the offence of
torture.”176 The Čelebići Trial Chamber noted, however, that all acts that constitute torture
also constitute wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.177 Mucic,
one of the accused in Čelebići, was charged with wilfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health based on superior responsibility for placing a burning fuse cord
around the genitals of Vukašin Mrkajic and Duško Bendo.178 The Trial Chamber found that
“the intentional act of placing of a burning fuse cord against Vukašin Mrkajic’s bare body
caused the victim such serious suffering and injury that it constitutes the offence of willfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health under Article 2 . . . of the
Statute.”179
The offense of willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health as a
grave breach is very similar to that of inhuman treatment as a grave breach. The similarities
and differences between the offenses will be discussed below.
5. Inhuman Treatment
The ICC has jurisdiction over inhuman treatment as a grave breach pursuant to Article
8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute. The ICC Elements of Crime state that inhuman treatment as
a grave breach occurs when:
1.

The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering
upon one or more persons.

2.

Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the
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Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3.

The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established
that protected status.

4.

The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conflict.

5.

The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the
existence of an armed conflict.180

The ICTY has jurisdiction over this offense pursuant to Article 2(b) of the ICTY Statute, and
because this is a grave breach that must take place within the context of an international
armed conflict, the ICTR does not have jurisdiction over this offense. Inhuman treatment
consists of:
1.

an intentional act or omission

2

that, when judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental,

3.

which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or
constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.181

As a grave breach the act must also take place within the context of an international armed
conflict and the victim must be a protected person pursuant to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949. All acts that constitute torture or willfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health also constitute inhuman treatment.182 Inhuman treatment extends
beyond torture and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health to
include acts that “violate the basic principle of humane treatment, particularly the respect for
human dignity.”183 Recognizing the fact-specific nature of this offense, the Čelebići Trial
Chamber concluded that “whether any particular act . . . is inconsistent with the principle of
humane treatment, and thus constitutes inhuman(e) treatment, is a question of fact to be
judged in all the circumstances of the particular case.”184
Mucic, one of the accused in Čelebići, was charged with inhuman treatment, based on
superior responsibility, for forcing Vaso Dordic and Veseljko Dordic, Muslim brothers who
were prisoners, to perform fellatio on one another for two to three minutes in full view of the
180
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other detainees.185

The Trial Chamber concluded that this act “constituted, at least, a

fundamental attack on their human dignity,” and thus constituted inhuman treatment under
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute.186
6.

Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence

Articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute grant the ICC jurisdiction
over rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization.
Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) also grants the Court jurisdiction over any other form of sexual violence
also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and article 8(2)(e)(vi) grants the
Court jurisdiction over any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation
of Common Article 3.
The specific enumeration of acts of sexual violence makes the Rome Statute unique.
While most of these acts have been found to be within the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction the
chambers have found jurisdiction based on customary international law or international
humanitarian treaty law rather than the statutes. Thus, when looking for jurisprudence from
the ad hoc tribunals for Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) offenses one will have to examine the ICTY
Article 2 cases on torture, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
and inhuman treatment. For Article 8(2)(e)(vi) offenses one should look to the ICTY Article
3 and ICTR Article 4 cases on torture, cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity.
D. Cumulative Convictions
Cumulative convictions under different statutory provisions for the same conduct are
permissible if the statutory provisions have materially distinct elements that are not contained
in the other.187 “An element is materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact
not required by the other.”188 For example, crimes against humanity contain an element that
is materially distinct from violations of the laws and customs of war. There must be a close
link between the alleged acts and the armed conflict for an act to be a violation of the laws
and customs of war and this requirement does not exist for crimes against humanity.
Additionally, crimes against humanity must take place within the context of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population. Thus, the same conduct can be the basis of
185

Id. at para. 1065.
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convictions for both crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war if
the necessary elements are met.189
The Foca Trial Chamber applied this test and convicted Kunarac and Vukovic of rape
and torture as crimes against humanity and as violations of the laws and customs of war for
the same acts.190 As noted above the crimes against humanity charges and the violations of
the laws and customs of war charges each have materially distinct elements. Rape and torture
also contain materially distinct elements. Rape contains a sexual penetration requirement,
which torture does not, and torture requires the severe infliction of pain or suffering for a
prohibited purpose, which rape does not.191 This analysis and holding was upheld by the
Foca Appeals Chamber.192 Based on this jurisprudence Radic in Kvočka was convicted of
persecution as a crime against humanity and torture as a violation of the laws and customs of
war based on the rapes and sexual assaults that were committed at the Omarska Camp.193
As noted in Part III(C)(2), the Semanza Trial Chamber did not convict the Accused of
cruel treatment as a violation of the laws and customs of war because that charge was based
on the same facts as the rape as a crime against humanity charge upon which he was
convicted. The Semanza Appeals Chamber reversed the acquittal on the cruel treatment
charge concluding that the Trial Chamber’s failure to enter the conviction was an error. The
Appeals Chamber concluded that Semanza’s “convictions for crimes against humanity
necessitated proof of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, whereas
convictions for war crimes require that the offences charged be closely related to the armed
conflict.”194 The Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber found the necessary nexus
was established such that the necessary elements of the crimes against humanity and the
serious violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions were established. To
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remedy the Trial Chamber’s error, the Appeals Chamber entered a conviction on the cruel
treatment charge in the indictment.195
Krstić was charged with persecution and genocide. The Trial Chamber held that the
persecution count was subsumed within the genocide count, thus it was inappropriate to
convict him on both counts.196 This ruling was reversed on appeal. The Appeals Chamber
concluded that persecution as a crime against humanity and genocide have different statutory
elements such that genocide does not subsume persecution.197 Genocide must be committed
with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.
Persecution as a crime against humanity does not require such intent, but it must be
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population and the
perpetrator must be aware of the relationship.198
When faced with charges under statutory provisions that do not contain materially
distinct elements, the chambers at the ad hoc tribunals have to decide upon which statutory
provision they will enter a conviction.199 The chamber should enter a conviction for the more
specific provision—the one that contains the materially distinct element.200 For example,
grave breaches contain an element that is materially distinct from violations of the laws and
customs of war—that the victim be a protected person.201 Violations of the laws and customs
of war, however, do not contain an element that is materially distinct from grave breaches.
Consequently chambers should enter convictions on the grave breach charges because they
are more specific.202
E. Criminal Responsibility
1. Individual Responsibility
Pursuant to the Rome Statute, an individual will be criminally responsible for a crime
within the Court’s jurisdiction if that person “[c]ommits such a crime, whether as an
individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other
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person is criminally responsible.”203 Criminal liability also exists for those that facilitate “the
commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its
attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission”204 or
[i]n any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such
contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i)

(ii)

Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court; or
Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to
commit the crime.205

Attempts give rise to criminal liability when an individual takes action
that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime
does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person’s
intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for
punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that
person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.206
The ICTY and ICTR Statutes state that “[a] person who planned, instigated, ordered,
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime
referred to in articles 2 to 5 [2 to 4 for the ICTR] of the present Statute, shall be individually
responsible for the crime.”207 The ad hoc tribunals have convicted persons of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes for committing, instigating, aiding and abetting, and
encouraging acts of sexual violence.
a. Instigating
The Akayesu Trial Chamber found the Accused criminally responsible for the
multiple rapes of ten girls and women in the cultural center of the bureau communal, “the
rape of Witness OO by an Interahamwe named Antoine in a field near the bureau
communal,” and “the forced undressing and public marching of Chantal naked at the bureau
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communal.”208 Akayesu’s responsibility was based on verbal instigation. Instigating is
“prompting another to commit an offence.”209
The Trial Chamber found that when “Witness OO and two other girls were
apprehended by Interahamwe in flight from the bureau communal, the Interahamwe went to
the Accused and told him that they were taking the girls away to sleep with them. The
Accused said ‘take them.’”210 He also “told the Interahamwe to undress Chantal and march
her around. He was laughing and happy to be watching and afterwards told the Interahamwe
to take her away and said ‘you should first of all make sure that you sleep with this girl.’”211
The Trial Chamber concluded that these actions were evidence that Akayesu ordered and
instigated sexual violence.212
Semanza was found guilty of rape (crime against humanity) for encouraging a crowd,
in front of commune and military authorities, to rape Tutsi women before killing them.213
Immediately after Semanza’s speech one of the men in the audience “had non-consensual
sexual intercourse with Victim A, who was hiding in a nearby home.”214 The Trial Chamber
concluded that due to the
influence of the Accused and to the fact that the rape of Victim A occurred
directly after the Accused instructed the group to rape, the Chamber finds that
the Accused’s encouragement constituted instigation because it was causally
connected and substantially contributed to the actions of the principal
perpetrator. The assailant’s statement that he had been given permission to
rape Victim A is evidence of a clear link between the Accused’s statement and
the crime. The Chamber also finds that the Accused made his statement
intentionally with the awareness that he was influencing the perpetrator to
commit the crime.215
Gacumbitsi was similarly found guilty of rape (crime against humanity) for
instigating the rape of Tutsi girls “by specifying that sticks be inserted into their genitals in
case they resisted.”216 The Trial Chamber concluded that the rapes that took place were a
direct consequence of Gacumbitsi’s instigation due to the closeness in time and space
between the instigation and the commission of the rapes.217
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b. Ordering
Niyitegeka ordered Interahamwe to undress a dead Tutsi woman and insert a piece of
sharpened wood into her genitalia.218 After the order was given the act was carried out.219
Finding that the Accused intended this act to be carried out and knew that it was part of a
widespread and systematic attack on the Tutsi population based on ethnic grounds, the Trial
Chamber convicted Niyitegeka of other inhumane acts (crime against humanity).220
c. Committing
An individual is criminally responsible for committing a crime “when he or she
physically perpetrates the relevant criminal act or engenders a culpable omission in violation
of a rule of criminal law.”221 There can be multiple perpetrators of the same crime when “the
conduct of each one of them fulfills the requisite elements of the definition of the substantive
offence.”222
Delic, an accused in the Čelebići case, personally raped Grozdana Cecez and Witness
A repeatedly and he was convicted of rape based on committing the crime.223 Muhimana was
similarly found to have personally raped seven women and was convicted of rape (crime
against humanity).224 In several recent ICTR cases convictions for rape based on the accused
218

Niyitegeka Trial Judgment, supra note 16, at para. 463.
Id..
220
Id. at paras. 466-67.
221
Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 390 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1-A, Judgment at
para.188 (July 15, 1999).
222
Id..
223
Čelebići Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 940, 943.
224
Muhimana Trial Judgment, supra note 17, at para. 552. The accused was found to have committed the
following rapes:
(a)
On 7 April 1994, in Gishyita town, the Accused took two women, Gorretti
Mukashyaka and Languida Kamukina, into his house and raped them. Thereafter he
drove them out of his house naked and invited Interahamwe and other civilians to see
what naked Tutsi girls looked like;
(b)
During the first week after the eruption of hostilities, the Accused pushed Esperance
Mukagasana onto his bed, stripped her naked, and raped her. He raped her in his
home several times;
(c)
On 15 April 1994, the Accused, acting in concert with a group of Interahamwe,
abducted a group of Tutsi girls and led them to a cemetery near Mubuga Parish
Church. The Accused then raped one of the abducted girls, Agnes Mukagatere;
(d)
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personally committing the rape have not been obtained or they have been overturned because
of insufficient evidence.

The Musema Appeals Chamber overturned Musema’s rape

conviction because new evidence was presented to the Appeals Chamber that established
reasonable doubt as to Musema’s guilt.225 In Kamuhanda the Trial Chamber acquitted the
accused of rape (crime against humanity) because the witnesses who testified about the rapes
did not observe the rapes themselves, but were told about them after the fact. The Trial
Chamber held that such hearsay evidence was insufficient for a rape (crime against humanity)
conviction.226
d. Aiding and Abetting
Aiding and abetting is “rendering a substantial contribution to the commission of a
crime.”

227

In Furundzija, the Trial Chamber held that the actus reus of aiding and abetting in

international criminal law “requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support
which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”228 The act of assistance need
not have caused the act of the principal; it could be an act or omission that took place before,
during, or after the commission of the crime.229 For example, bringing women to a specific
location to be raped by soldiers has been held to constitute aiding and abetting rape.230
Presence during the commission of a crime within the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence
has been held to constitute aiding and abetting. The Kayishema Trial Chamber held that the
presence of a spectator who knew that his or her presence would encourage perpetrators in
committing their criminal activities can lead to criminal responsibility for the acts committed
by the perpetrators.231 The Foca Trial Chamber similarly held that while presence at the
scene of the crime alone is not conclusive evidence of aiding and abetting, such presence can
constitute aiding and abetting when it “is shown to have a significant legitimizing or
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encouraging effect on the principal.”232 In Furundzija, the accused interrogated Witness A
and he was present while another individual repeatedly raped her. The Trial Chamber
concluded that Furundzija’s “presence and continued interrogation of Witness A encouraged
Accused B and substantially contributed to the criminal acts committed by him.”233 He was
thus found guilty of aiding and abetting the rape of Witness A.234
The required mens rea is “knowledge that these acts assist the commission of the
offence.”235 The individual aiding and abetting does not have to share the principal’s mens
rea, but he or she must know about the essential elements of the crime, which includes the
perpetrator’s mens rea, and make the conscious decision to act knowing that he or she is
supporting the commission of the crime.236
e. Joint Criminal Enterprise
The ad hoc tribunals have held that “the acts of one person can give rise to the
criminal culpability of another where both participate in the execution of a common criminal
plan.”237 In Tadic the Appeals Chamber identified three categories of joint criminal liability
or common purpose cases. The first is when all of those participating have the same criminal
intention.238 For example, the co-perpetrators develop a plan to kill a group of people and
even though members of the group have different tasks, they all possess the intent to kill.239
The second category is similar to the first and it is referred to as the “concentration camp”
cases. In such cases individuals with a position of authority within a concentration camp
were held criminally liable for the atrocities that took place within the concentration camps.
Liability was based on finding that the individual was actively involved in the repressive
system (as could be inferred from their authoritative position), he or she was aware of the
nature of the system, and he or she intended to further the common purpose of mistreating
prisoners.240 The final category of cases addresses individuals who participate in a joint
criminal enterprise and one of the co-perpetrators commits an act that was outside of the
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common design, but was nonetheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of carrying out
the common design.241
The Tadic Appeals Chamber held that participating in a common criminal enterprise
gives rise to criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. Based on
the object and purpose of the ICTY Statute, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Statute
“intends to extend the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal to all those ‘responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law’ committed in the former Yugoslavia
(Article 1).”242 Thus the Statute does not limit its jurisdiction to those who plan, instigate,
order, physically perpetuate a crime, or aid and abet in the commission of a crime. It also
includes those who work together with several persons having a common purpose to “embark
on criminal activity that is then carried out either jointly or by some members of this plurality
of persons.”243

The Rome Statute explicitly provides for jurisdiction over those who

contribute “to the commission or attempted commission of [a crime within the Court’s
jurisdiction] by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.”244
The Tadic Appeals Chamber held that the actus reus for participating in a joint
criminal enterprise or acting with a common criminal purpose requires:
1.

A plurality of persons.

2.

The existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to
or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute.

3.

Participation of the accused in the common design involving the
perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute.245

The people working together do not have to be organized in a particular military, political, or
administrative structure and their common plan, design, or purpose need not have been
previously arranged or formulated.246 The necessary participation does not have to involve
the commission of the crime, but can be assisting in or contributing to the execution of the
common plan, design, or purpose.247
The mens rea requirements for joint criminal enterprise liability vary depending upon
the category of common liability at issue. For the first category in which the co-perpetrators
241
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have the same criminal intention, each accused must have the intent to perpetrate the
particular crime.248

For “concentration camp” cases, the accused must have personal

knowledge of the system of ill-treatment and the intent to further the common system of illtreatment.249 In the third category of cases, the accused must intend to participate in and
further the joint criminal enterprise, it must have been foreseeable that a member of the group
would commit the criminal act outside of the common plan, and the accused must have
willingly taken that risk.250
These elements have been applied in Furundzija, Krstić, and Kvočka to hold
individuals criminally responsible for acts of sexual violence. The Furundzija Trial Chamber
found Furundzija guilty of torture (violation of the laws and customs of war) for his
involvement in the rape and sexual assault of Witness A. Furundzija interrogated Witness A
while she was “in a state of nudity.”251 During the interrogation another individual referred
to as Accused B “rubbed his knife on the inner thighs of Witness A and threatened to cut out
her private parts if she did not tell the truth in answer to the interrogation by the accused.”252
A second phase of the interrogation involved Witness A being confronted with Witness D [a
friend of Witness A’s] to make her confess. Accused B raped Witness A “by the mouth,
vagina and anus and forced her to lick his penis clean.”253

Furundzija continued to

interrogate Witness A and as the interrogation intensified the sexual assaults and rapes
intensified as well.254 The Trial Chamber concluded that Furundzija’s interrogation and
Accused B’s rape and sexual assault of Witness A became one process.255

The Trial

Chamber found that Furundzija and Accused B intended to obtain information from Witness
A that they believed would be helpful to the Croatian Defence Council.
The Furundzija Trial Chamber held that to be guilty of torture as a co-perpetrator an
individual must “participate in an integral part of the torture and partake of the purpose
behind the torture, that is the intent to obtain information or a confession, to punish or
intimidate, humiliate, coerce or discriminate against the victim or a third person.”256
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Furundzija was found criminally liable for the torture of Witness A as a co-perpetrator “by
virtue of his interrogation of her as an integral part of the torture.”257
On appeal Furundzija argued that the Prosecutor failed to prove that there was a direct
connection between his interrogation of Witness A and Accused B’s attacks on Witness A.
He further contended that there was no proof that he “planned, agreed, or intended that
Witness A would be touched or threatened in any way in the course of his questioning.”258
Recalling the Tadic Appeals Judgment, the Furundzija Appeals Chamber stated that coperpetrators do not have to have a previously arranged plan, design, or purpose.259 The
way the events in this case developed precludes any reasonable doubt that the
Appellant and Accused B knew what they were doing to Witness A and for
what purpose they were treating her in that manner; that they had a common
purpose may be readily inferred from all the circumstances, including (1) the
interrogation of Witness A by the Appellant in both the Large Room while she
was in a state of nudity, and the Pantry where she was sexually assaulted in the
Appellant’s presence; and (2) the acts of sexual assault committed by Accused
B on Witness A in both rooms, as charged in the Amended Indictment.260
The Appeals Chamber concluded by stating,“[w]here the act of one accused contributes to the
purpose of the other, and both acted simultaneously, in the same place and within full view of
each other, over a prolonged period of time, the argument that there was no common purpose
is plainly unsustainable.”261
In Kvočka the accused were tried for their role in the criminal acts that were
committed at the Omarska camp. Thus this case closely resembles the second category of
cases—the concentration camp cases. Following the Tadic Appeals Chamber, the Kvočka
Trial Chamber held that to be criminally responsible based on a joint criminal enterprise the
accused “must have carried out acts that substantially assisted or significantly effected the
furtherance of the goals of the enterprise, with the knowledge that his acts or omissions
facilitated the crimes committed through the enterprise.”262 Individuals “who work in a job
or participate in a system in which crimes are committed on such a large scale and systematic
basis incur individual criminal responsibility if they knowingly participate in the criminal
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endeavor, and their acts or omissions significantly assist or facilitate the commission of the
crimes.”263
The Kvočka Trial Chamber concluded that Omarska camp functioned as a joint
criminal enterprise in which a mix of serious crimes were “committed intentionally,
maliciously, selectively, and in some instances sadistically against the non-Serbs detained in
the camp.”264 The crimes were committed by a plurality of persons and the common purpose
was “to persecute and subjugate non-Serb detainees.”265
The five accused were all found guilty of persecution for the sexual assaults and rapes
that took place in the Omarska camp. They each worked at the camp and the Trial Chamber
concluded that they were aware that persecution and ethnic violence were prevalent in the
camp and that their work facilitated the commission of crimes.266 As for their knowledge, the
Trial Chamber stated
anyone regularly working in or visiting Omarska camp would have had to
know that crimes were widespread throughout the camp. Knowledge of the
joint criminal enterprise can be inferred from such indicia as the position held
by the accused, the amount of time spent in the camp, the function he
performs, his movement throughout the camp, and any contact he has with
detainees, staff personnel, or outsiders visiting the camp. Knowledge of the
abuses could also be gained through ordinary senses. Even if the accused
were not eye-witnesses to crimes committed in Omarska camp, evidence of
abuses could been seen by observing the bloodied, bruised, and injured bodies
of detainees, by observing heaps of dead bodies lying in piles around the
camp, and noticing the emaciated and poor condition of detainees, as well as
by observing the cramped facilities or the bloodstained walls. Evidence of
abuses could be heard from the screams of pain and cries of suffering, from
the sounds of the detainees begging for food and water and beseeching their
tormentors not to beat or kill them, and from the gunshots heard everywhere in
the camp. Evidence of the abusive conditions in the camp could also be
smelled as a result of the deteriorating corpses, the urine and feces soiling the
detainees[’] clothes, the broken and overflowing toilets, the dysentery
afflicting the detainees, and the inability of detainees to wash or bathe for
weeks or months.267
Kvočka’s conviction for persecution was overturned on appeal. Kvočka argued that the
Prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the rapes and sexual assaults took
place during his stay at Omarska camp. The Trial Chamber held that the accused would not
263
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be criminally responsible for crimes committed before they arrived at Omarska camp or after
they left. The Appeals Chamber found that there was no evidence before the Trial Chamber
regarding when the relevant rapes and sexual assaults took place and it noted that the Trial
Chamber did not rule on this point.268

Thus Kvočka’s conviction for persecution was

269

overturned.

Krstić illustrates the third category of common purpose liability. Krstić participated
in a joint criminal enterprise “to forcibly transfer the Bosnian Muslim women, children and
elderly from Potočari on 12 and 13 July and to create a humanitarian crisis.”270 Rape,
murder, beating, and abuse were not the object of the joint criminal enterprise, but the Trial
Chamber concluded that such acts were a natural and foreseeable consequence of the ethnic
cleansing campaign.271 The finding that Krstić participated in a joint criminal enterprise to
ethnically cleanse the Srebrenica enclave was based on evidence demonstrating that
the political and/or military leadership of the VRS formulated a plan to
permanently remove the Bosnian Muslim population from Srebrenica,
following the take-over of the enclave. From 11 through 13 July, this plan of
what is colloquially referred to as “ethnic cleansing” was realised mainly
through the forcible transfer of the bulk of the civilian population out of
Potočari, once the military aged men had been separated from the rest of the
population. General Krstić was a key participant in the forcible transfer,
working in close co-operation with other military officials of the VRS Main
Staff and the Drina Corps.272
The Trial Chamber found the mens rea requirements established—rape, murder, beating, and
abuse were natural and foreseeable consequences of the campaign to ethnically cleanse the
Srebrenica enclave.
General Krstić must have been aware that an outbreak of these crimes would
be inevitable given the lack of shelter, the density of the crowds, the
vulnerable condition of the refugees, the presence of many regular and
irregular military and paramilitary units in the area and the sheer lack of
sufficient numbers of UN soldiers to provide protection. In fact, on 12 July,
the VRS organised and implemented the transportation of the women, children
and elderly outside the enclave; General Krstić was himself on the scene and
exposed to firsthand knowledge that the refugees were being mistreated by
268
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VRS or other armed forces.273
Krstić was charged with persecution and rape was one of the underlying acts. Krstić was
held criminally responsible for the rapes that took place in Potočari based on his involvement
in a joint criminal enterprise in which rape, while not the object of the criminal enterprise,
was a natural and foreseeable consequence.
2. Superior or Command Responsibility
Individuals can also be criminally responsible, as superiors or commanders, for the
actions of their subordinates. Article 28 of the Rome Statute states that
(a)

(b)

273

A military commander or person effectively acting as a military
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case
may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly
over such forces, where:
(i)

That military commander or person either knew or, owing to
the circumstances at the time, should have known that the
forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and

(ii)

That military commander or person failed to take all necessary
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in
paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under
his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her
failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i)

The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were
committing or about to commit such crimes;

(ii)

The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior; and

(iii)

The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities
for investigation and prosecution.
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The ad hoc tribunals’ statutes similarly address superior or commander responsibility.
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about
to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof.274
The details of this type of responsibility with regard to acts of sexual violence were first
addressed by the Čelebići Trial Chamber. This chamber held that the elements for superior or
command responsibility are:
(i)

the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;

(ii)

the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was
about to be or had been committed; and

(iii)

the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.275

The Čelebići articulation of the superior responsibility elements states the rule applied by the
ad hoc tribunals. This statement of the elements was approved by the Čelebići and Blaskic
Appeals Chambers and has been applied by the Trial Chambers in Foca, Musema, Kvočka,
Kamuhanda, and Semanza.
a. Superior-Subordinate Relationship
To demonstrate a superior-subordinate relationship the accused must have had
“effective control over the persons committing the underlying violations of international

274
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humanitarian law.”276 He or she must have the “material ability to prevent and punish the
commission of these offenses.”277 The effective control test was adopted in Article 28 of the
Rome Statute.278 Having effective control and the “material ability to prevent and punish the
commission of these offenses” does not require being the person that actually dispenses the
punishment. The Kvočka Trial Chamber held that the superior need only “take an important
step in the disciplinary process.”279
The superior’s authority can be de jure or de facto and the superior responsibility
concept applies equally to military and civilian supervisors.280 De jure power by itself is not
enough to establish command or superior responsibility—there must also be a finding of
effective control.281

The Čelebići Appeals Chamber held, however, that “a court may

presume that possession of such power prima facie results in effective control unless proof to
the contrary is produced.”282
Substantial influence is not sufficient for establishing effective control. In addressing
an argument advanced by the Prosecution on appeal, the Appeals Chamber found that
customary law has specified a standard of effective control, although it does
not define precisely the means by which the control must be exercised. It is
clear, however, that substantial influence as a means of control in any sense
which falls short of the possession of effective control over subordinates,
which requires the possession of material abilities to prevent subordinate
offences or to punish subordinate offenders, lacks sufficient support in State
practice and judicial decisions. Nothing relied on by the Prosecution indicates
that there is sufficient evidence of State practice or judicial authority to
support a theory that substantial influence as a means of exercising command
responsibility has the standing of a rule of customary law, particularly a rule
by which criminal liability would be imposed.283
276
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The Čelebići Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s definition of superior responsibility and its
conclusion that it applied to those with de jure and de facto authority and to military and civilian supervisors
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Additionally, general influence in the relevant community is not sufficient. In Semanza, the
Trial Chamber reiterated that the correct legal standard for establishing a superiorsubordinate relationship is showing “a formal or informal hierarchical relationship involving
an accused’s effective control over the direct perpetrators. A simple showing of an accused’s
general influence in the community is insufficient to establish a superior-subordinate
relationship.”284 The Trial Chamber noted that
[o]ther than general evidence of the Accused’s influence, there is no credible
or reliable evidence detailing the specific nature of the superior-subordinate
relationship between the Accused and any of the known perpetrators,
including those to whom he gave instructions or encouragement to rape and
kill. Absent this type of evidence, there is no concrete indication that the
Accused had actual authority over the principal perpetrators.
b. Mens rea
Superior responsibility does not create strict liability for supervisors who fail to
prevent or punish the crimes of their subordinates.285 The mens rea requirement is that the
superior
(1)

had actual knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial
evidence, that his subordinates were committing or about to commit
crimes referred to under Article 2 to 5 of the Statute, or

(2)

. . . had in his possession information of a nature, which at the least,
would put him on notice of the risk of such offences by indicating the
need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether such
crimes were committed or were about to be committed by his
subordinates.286

Prosecutors must present direct evidence of knowledge or establish that the superior had such
knowledge via circumstantial evidence.287
288

presumed.

The existence of such knowledge cannot be

The following indicia can be considered by a Trial Chamber in determining

whether or not a superior had the requisite knowledge:
(a)
(b)

The number of illegal acts;
The type of illegal acts;
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(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)

The scope of illegal acts;
The time during which the illegal acts occurred;
The number and type of troops involved;
The logistics involved, if any;
The geographical location of the acts;
The widespread occurrence of the acts;
The tactical tempo of operations;
The modus operandi of similar illegal acts;
The officers and staff involved; [and]
The location of the commander at the time.289

In the same way that de jure authority does not prove effective control, it does not prove
knowledge.290 The information that a superior must have can be written or oral and, while it
does not have to be explicit, it must “suggest the need to inquire further.”291 The Kvočka
Trial Chamber specifically noted that “if a superior has prior knowledge that women detained
by male guards in detention facilities are likely to be subjected to sexual violence, that would
put him on sufficient notice that extra measures are demanded in order to prevent such
crimes.”292
The Prosecutor has sought to expand the mens rea requirement for superior
responsibility. In Čelebići the Prosecution sought to satisfy the mens rea requirement by
showing that a superior lacked the information that put him on notice of the perpetration of
war crimes “as a result of a serious dereliction of his duty to obtain the information within his
reasonable access.”293

The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument concluding that

“[n]eglect of a duty to acquire such knowledge, however, does not feature in the provision as
a separate offence, and a superior is not therefore liable under the provision for such failures
but only for failing to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or to punish.”294
The Kvočka Trial Chamber applied this reasoning when it stated that “Article 7(3) does not
impose a duty upon a superior to go out of his way to obtain information about crimes
committed by subordinates, unless he is in some way put on notice that criminal activity is
afoot.”295
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In Blaskic the Trial Chamber concluded that the “know or reason to know”
requirement is satisfied if it is shown that the accused “should have known.”296 The Appeals
Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that General Blaskic knew or had reason
to know about the rapes that took place at the Dubravica primary school.

The Trial

Chamber’s conclusion was based on circumstantial evidence, and from this evidence it
concluded that “General Blaskic could not have been unaware of the atmosphere of terror and
the rapes which occurred at the school.”297 The Appeals Chamber overturned this ruling
stating that
the Čelebići Appeal Judgement has settled the issue of the interpretation of the
standard of “had reason to know.” In that judgement, the Appeals Chamber
stated that “a superior will be criminally responsible through the principles of
superior responsibility only if information was available to him which would
have put him on notice of offences committed by subordinates.”298
The Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of the mens rea
requirement was “not consistent with the jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber.”299 It then
applied the Čelebići interpretation and concluded that General Blaskic did not have effective
command or control over the units that committed the rapes and thus reversed his conviction
for persecution as a crime against humanity, which was partially based on rape.300
c. Actus rea
Superiors are required to “take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
commission of offences by their subordinates or, if such crimes have been committed, to
punish the perpetrators thereof.”301 Stating that the evaluation of this factor is “inextricably
linked to the facts,” the Čelebići Appeals Chamber did not offer a general standard.302
Superiors can only be criminally liable for failing to take action that is within their powers.303
What is within a superior’s power is that which is “within his material possibility.”304
Additionally, causation is not an element of superior responsibility.305
296
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Id. at para. 732.
298
Blaskic Appeals Judgment, supra note 275, at para. 62.
299
Id.
300
Id. at paras. 612-13.
301
Čelebići Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 394.
302
Id.
303
Id. at para. 395; see also Kamuhanda Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 610.
304
Čelebići Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 395.
305
Id. at para. 398. The Trial Chamber concluded:
297

Notwithstanding the central place assumed by the principle of causation in criminal law,
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IV.

CONCLUSION
Sexual violence is as much a part of war as murder is.

The ad hoc tribunals’

jurisprudence provides persuasive authority for the adjudication of sexual crimes at the ICC.
While there is always room for improvement, the ad hoc tribunals have provided a strong
foundation upon which the ICC can build.

As the ad hoc tribunals implement their

Completion Strategies, there are several cases currently pending at the ICTR that should be
monitored for further jurisprudential developments. These cases include the Butre Case,
Karemera, Muranyi, Military I, Military II, and Government I.306 The charges in these cases
include rape and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity. Additionally, there are several
other cases in which indictments have been issued, but the trials have yet to begin that
address acts of sexual violence. In Bisengimana the accused is charged with rape, torture,
and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity, cruel treatment and torture as violations of the
laws and customs of war.307 Juvenal Rugambarara has been charged with rape and torture as
crimes against humanity and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular rape and enforced
prostitution as serious violations of the laws and customs of war.308

In Hategekiman,

Mpambara, Bikindi, and Nzabirinda the accused are charged with a variety of crimes
including genocide based on acts of sexual violence, rape, persecution and inhumane acts as
crimes against humanity.309
The Preamble to the Rome Statute states that “the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished” and that the State Parties
are determined “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to
causation has not traditionally been postulated as a conditio sine qua non for the imposition of
criminal liability on superiors for their failure to prevent or punish offences committed by
their subordinates. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber has found no support for the existence of
a requirement of proof of causation as a separate element of superior responsibility, either in
the existing body of case law, the formulation of the principle in existing treaty law, or, with
one exception, in the abundant literature on this subject.
Id.
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contribute to the prevention of such crimes.” It is hoped that this report will aid lawyers,
judges, academics, and activists in ensuring that these pledges are implemented with regard
to wartime acts of sexual violence.
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ANNEX I: CRIMINAL CHARGES & THE RELEVANT AD HOC TRIBUNAL
CASES
CRIME
GENOCIDE

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Enslavement
Torture

Rape

Persecution

Other inhumane acts

WAR CRIMES
Torture

CASE
Akayesu
Gacumbitsi
Kajelijeli
Kamuhanda
Kayishema
Krstić
Muhimana
Musema
Niyitegeka
Stakic

TRIBUNAL/COURT
ICTR
ICTR
ICTR
ICTR
ICTR
ICTY
ICTR
ICTR
ICTR
ICTY

Foca
Foca
Kvočka
Semanza
Simic
Akayesu
Foca
Gacumbitsi
Kajelijeli
Kamuhanda
Kvočka
Muhimana
Musema
Nikolic
Semanza
Stakic
Krstić
Kupreskić
Kvočka
Nikolic
Plavsic
Stakic
Todorović
Bagilishema
CDF
Kayishema
Niyitegeka

ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTR
ICTY
ICTR
ICTY
ICTR
ICTR
ICTR
ICTY
ICTR
ICTR
ICTY
ICTR
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTR
SCSL
ICTR
ICTR

Čelebići

ICTY
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CRIME

CASE
Foca
Furundzija
Musema
Rape
Čelebići
Furundzija
Cruel Treatment
Čelebići
Semanza
Simic
Outrages upon personal dignity
Cesic
Foca
Kamuhanda
Musema
Semanza
Wilfully causing great suffering or Čelebići
serious injury to body or health
Inhuman treatment
Čelebići
CUMULATIVE CONVICTIONS

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Individual Responsibility

Superior or Command Responsibility

TRIBUNAL/COURT
ICTY
ICTY
ICTR
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTR
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTR
ICTR
ICTR
ICTY
ICTY

Čelebići
Foca
Krstić
Kvočka
Semanza

ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTR

Akayesu
Čelebići
Foca
Furundzija
Gacumbitsi
Kamuhanda
Kayishema
Krstić
Kvočka
Muhimana
Niyitegeka
Semanza
Tadic
Blaskic
Čelebići
Foca
Kamuhanda
Krstić
Kvočka
Musema
Semanza

ICTR
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTR
ICTR
ICTR
ICTY
ICTY
ICTR
ICTR
ICTR
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICTR
ICTY
ICTY
ICTR
ICTR
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